

# Threatle - predicting the future of threats in 6 steps

Judgement Day, Slovakia, May 2023


@vanjasvajcer



# Who am I?



Vanja Svajcer



Security Researcher at Cisco Talos



- Automated analysis
- Mobile malware
- WinDBG
- Telemetry analysis



Based in Croatia

Threatle – predicting the future of threats in 6 steps



Defender teams



Defender tools



Adversary



Threats




Technology

|   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Talos



TALOS



# Talos Role at Cisco


## Protecting Customers.

- Build new detection logic to improve Cisco products (block, behavior analysis, and reputation/categorization)
- Work with national security and law enforcement partners to keep the world safe
- Gather intelligence & first-person research on cyber threat actors, tools, and techniques.
- Communicate findings through blog posts, intel bulletins to customers and sharing with industry partners




# Our job is protecting your network

Talos is the threat intelligence group at Cisco. We are here to fight the good fight — we work to keep our customers, and users at large, safe from malicious actors.



# From Unknown to Understood





|   |   |   |   |   |
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Tools



TALOS





# Data analytics

- Log and telemetry ingestion
- Threat Intelligence platforms (big data)
- Machine learning and anomaly detection
- AI for classification

# Threat analysis

- Large scale automated static and dynamic
- Similarity and clustering
- Graph based actor tracking
- ATT&CK
- Mature manual analysis tools and process

# Detection Comes in Different Flavors

## Malware Families

*i.e. Emotet/Qbot/Trickbot*



### Technical Detection:

*Indicated Threat*

- NGIPS/NGFW Signature on
- Command and Control (C2) Activity
- ClamAV Signature for system activity
- C2 IP Address/Domain Blocked



**Applicable to Specific Threat**

Some detections are designed with a specific threat in mind, others are designed to catch malicious behavior



### Behavioral Protections:


*Indicated actor*

- Bitsadmin used to download file
- Powershell used to disable EDR
- Scheduled Task Created
- Connection blocked to suspected phishing page

**Applicable to all malicious activity**

|   |   |   |   |   |
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| E | N | D | E | D |
| E | N | E | M | Y |

Adversary



# Commodity (common)



# Ransomware & double extortion



## **i** Description

- Lots of Individual Actors
- Spray and Pray
- Disruptive Nuisance

## Tools

- Emotet, Qbot and various Loaders
- Docs, Exec, PDFs, RTFs
- RaaS

## Tactics

- Spam with embedded files
- Link based Spam
- Tor and Bitcoin/Crypto currency

## Processes

- Encrypts files.
- Some contain lateral movement functionality or share encryption

# Infostealers (Redline)



Loss of sensitive or proprietary data, especially financial data



Exfiltrated data could be used for a wide range of malicious follow-on activity



Potentially indicative of a much larger security breach involving other malware families



# Spamming botnets - Emotet



## **i** Description

- Banking Trojan + a lot more
- Modular Malware
- Widespread global distribution

## Tools

- Modular payloads including ransomware
- Multiple botnets distributing threat
- Network based propagation


## Tactics

- Email Delivery Common (URL & Maldoc)
- Malware Downloaders Common (.DOCX, .XLSX, etc)
- Polymorphic/Sandbox Evasion


## Processes

- Get foothold, gather information
- Base payload on highest ROI
- Sophisticated commodity malware

# Opportunistic (Targeted)



# “Big Game Hunting”



# Nation (APT)



# Cisco Talos & Ukraine



## Previous assistance

- Six years in region
- On the ground during NotPetya
- Assisted with forensic analysis multiple events
- Assisted in monitoring of election infrastructure during 2019 presidential election



## Partnerships

- State Special Communications Service of Ukraine (SSSCIP)
- Cyberpolice Department of the National Police of Ukraine
- National Coordination Center for Cybersecurity (NCCC at the NSDC of Ukraine)



## Current assistance

- Providing defensive guidance
- Assisting with forensic analysis
- Providing intelligence
- Assisting in hunting activities


# Gamaredon Group

|                              |  |
|------------------------------|--|
| <b>Aliases</b>               | Primitive Bear, Armageddon, Shuckworm, Winterflouder, BlueAlpha, BlueOtso, IronTiden, SectorC08, Callisto, Trident Ursa  |
| <b>Affiliations</b>          | Russia   |
| <b>Active since</b>          | 2013   |
| <b>Goals</b>                 | Espionage, data theft, establishing long-term access   |
| <b>Victimology</b>           | Actively targets Ukrainian entities, specifically government organizations, critical infrastructure and entities affiliated with Ukraine's defense, security and law enforcement apparatus. Secondary operations include broad targeting of entities in Europe and globally, including, government, military, humanitarian and non-profit organizations. |
| <b>Notable TTPs</b>          | Social engineering techniques, spear-phishing, compromised domains and dynamic DNS, long-term access, data exfiltration, custom script-based malware.  |
| <b>Malware &amp; tooling</b> | Gamaredon employs a variety of custom, self-developed implants that are used exclusively by the adversary ranging from customized script-based malware to infostealers and backdoors. Notable malware families include GammaLoad, GammaSteel, Giddome, Powerpunch and Pterodo.   |



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| V | I | R | U | S |

Threats – the daily reality







Attackers targeted health care and public health companies the most in the first quarter of 2023



# Observed Trends



Most-observed  
threat was  
web shells



Top initial vector  
was exploitation of  
public-facing  
applications



Top weakness was  
lack of MFA


# Malicious OneNote documents continue to be leveraged this quarter



Qakbot (Qbot) commodity loader




Looking forward: Emotet




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Technology




# Web 3.0 “revolution”





# NFTs Use IPFS Too!



etherscan.io/address/0x2a46f2ffd99e19a89476e2f62270e0a35bbf0756#readContract

Code Read Contract Write Contract

23. tokenURI

\_tokenId (uint256)

40913


Query

↳ string

[ tokenURI(uint256) method Response ]

>> string : ipfs://ipfs/QmPAg1mjxcEQPPtqsLoEcauVedaeMH81WXDPvPx3VC5zUz

# Email Attachment PDF





# Generative AI to rescue

Z

Pretend you are a CFO and you just change your bank. You have a new account number. Can you write a message to partners to inform them that they should use the new bank account for future payments?



Sure, here's an example message you could send to partners to inform them of your new bank account number:



Subject: Change of Bank Account Information

Dear [Partner Name],

I am writing to inform you that our company has recently changed its bank account. Please update your records to reflect the new account information below:

New Bank Name: [Insert Bank Name]

New Bank Account Number: [Insert Account Number]

# Generative AI to rescue

Z

Do you remember what I asked about writing a pretend letter from a CEO to partners about the change of the bank account? Could you rewrite it in Slovakian?



Sure, here's the message in Slovakian:



Predmet: Zmena bankového účtu

Vážený partner,

rád by som vás informoval o tom, že naša spoločnosť nedávno zmenila svoj bankový účet.

Prosím, aktualizujte svoje záznamy s novými informáciami o účte uvedenými nižšie:

Názov novej banky: [Vložiť názov banky]

Nové číslo bankového účtu: [Vložiť číslo účtu]

Smerovacie číslo: [Vložiť smerovacie číslo]

# The Future of threats

(It is all about the potential)

# The future



Maturing LLMs used by threat actors



New trends and techniques discovered



Supply chain attacks major threat



Further down – automated discovery 0 days



Same problems and same distance  
between the opponents



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